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Introduction
In the grocery industry it has become a widespread practice that retailers charge slotting fees to their suppliers. Basically, manufacturers have to pay a fee to get their products placed in the retailers'store shelves. These payments are made for both the initial access to the retailers' shelves in the case of new products as well as the continuing access in the case of already established products.
In addition, retailers demand for a wide number of add-on fees such as promotional, advertising and stocking allowances. These fees di¤er greatly with respect to the product, manufacturer, and market conditions. The average amount of (so-called) slotting fees per item, per retailer and per metropolitan area ranges from $2,313 to $21,768 (FTC 2003) . Moreoever, slotting fees vary widely within product categories. The importance of slotting allowances in the relationship between retailers and manufacturers has dramatically increased since the late 1980ies. At the same time, the retail industry, particularly in Europe, has gone through a profound consolidation process that has limited the suppliers'trading alternatives (EC 1999 , OFT 1998 . Thus, goods have to pass through "the decision-making screen of a single dominant retailer" to be distributed to …nal consumers (FTC 2001) . In particular, small manufacturers often complain that they are more likely to pay slotting fees than large manufacturers (FTC 2001 (FTC , 2003 . 1 However, the retailer's bargaining power does not su¢ ce to explain the emergence of slotting fees in supplier-retailer relationships, as large retailers like Wal-Mart and Costco with tremendous bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers never charge slotting fees (FTC 2001) .
The grocery industry is also characterized by the increasing preference of consumers to bundle their purchases to economize on their shopping costs. That is, consumers prefer to concentrate purchases with a single retailer avoiding additional shopping costs when using additional retailers. In the UK, about 70% of consumers practice such a so-called one-stop shopping behavior in spending about 80% of their weekly expenditures for fast moving consumer goods on a weekly main trip (UK Competition Commission 2000). If consumers bundle their purchases, their buying decision depends on the price for the whole shopping basket rather than on individual product prices. This induces positive demand externalities, i.e. complementarity between the products o¤ered at a retail outlet. 2 Our paper provides a new explanation for the emergence of slotting fees in supplier-retailer relationships by explicitly taking into account consumer shopping costs. 3 Referring to positive demand externalities due to shopping costs, we show that slotting fees may emerge as a result of a rent-shifting mechanism in a three-party negotiation framework with complete information. We depart from the literature demonstrating that slotting fees are introduced for signaling or screening purposes (Kelly 1992 , Chu 1992 , DeVuyst 2005 and Sullivan 1997 ). 4 We consider a monopolistic retailer that negotiates sequentially with two suppliers of substitutable products. In a similar framework Marx and Sha¤er (1999) show that below-cost pricing in intermediate good markets can arise as it allows the retailer and the …rst supplier to extract rents from the second supplier. This is due to the fact that the retailer's disagreement payo¤ with the second supplier is decreasing in the price at which she can buy additional units from the …rst supplier. Accordingly, downward distortion of the wholesale price with the …rst supplier improves the retailer's disagreement payo¤ in the second negotiation and, thus, allows the …rst supplier and the retailer to extract rents from the second supplier. Taking consumer shopping costs explicitly into account, we show that the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier can also be upward distorted. Upward distortion occurs if the positive demand externalities resulting from consumer shopping costs outweigh the original substitution e¤ect. In this case, a higher wholesale price for the …rst good does not only reduce the demand for that good, it also lowers the demand for the second good. This, in turn, diminishes the incremental contribution of the second supplier to the joint pro…t with the retailer. Hence, the retailer's bargaining position in the second negotiation improves which enables the …rst supplier and the retailer to extract rents from the second supplier. However, the upward distorted wholesale price makes the …rst supplier the residual claimant of the rent shifted from the second supplier. To share the rent with the retailer, the …rst supplier pays a …xed fee to the retailer as long as her bargaining power is su¢ ciently low. Thus, slotting fees 2 For an early account of consumer shopping behavior and the related positive demand externalities, see Stahl (1982 and 1987) and Beggs (1994) . 3 Following Sha¤er (1991), we de…ne slotting allowances as a negative …xed transfer in a two-part tari¤ contract between a manufacturer and a retailer. 4 In a similar vein (sharing risk explanation), see Nocke and Thanassoulis (2010).
3 may emerge in a sequential bargaining framework when consumers bundle their purchases to economize on their shopping costs. A ban of slotting fees would disable the …rst supplier to compensate the retailer for a higher wholesale price.
Thus, a ban of slotting fees would reduce the extent of upward distortion in the …rst negotiation leading to a higher social welfare.
We further aim at explaining why some suppliers pay slotting fees, while their competitors do not. For this purpose, we endogenize the order of negotiation.
Considering di¤erent degrees of exogenously given bargaining power for the suppliers, we show that the retailer prefers to negotiate …rst with the weaker supplier in order to improve her bargaining position vis-à-vis the stronger supplier. Since slotting fees are only paid by the …rst supplier, suppliers with little bargaining power are more likely to pay slotting fees than market or brand leaders. Moreover, we …nd that powerful retailers do not charge slotting fees.
These retailers already capture a large share of the overall industry pro…t such that their incentive to distort wholesale prices for strategic purposes is relatively low. This is consistent with the observation that the largest and most powerful retailers like Wal-Mart or Costco never charge slotting fees to their suppliers (FTC 2001).
Our paper contributes to the literature on slotting fees based on the strategic use of contracts in vertically related industries. 5 Sha¤er (1991) shows that slotting fees can constitute a facilitating mechanism for softening competition in downstream markets. In the context of multi-product markets, Innes and Hamil- 4 paper the emergence of slotting fees does also not depend on retail competition.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we specify our model taking into account consumer shopping behavior. We then analyze subgame perfect equilibria of the game in Section 3. Welfare implications are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 extends our basic framework to endogenize the order of negotiations. Finally, we summarize our results and conclude.
Model
Consider a vertical structure with two upstream …rms U i ; i = 1; 2; and a down- Negotiations. We assume that the downstream …rm negotiates sequentially with her suppliers about a two-part supply tari¤ T i (w i ; F i ), which entails a linear wholesale price w i and a …xed fee F i : Thus, the retailer negotiates …rst with supplier U 1 and then enters into negotiations with supplier U 2 . Each retailersupplier pair aims at maximizing its respective joint pro…t when determining the wholesale price. 7 The surplus is divided such that each party gets her disagreement payo¤ plus a share of the incremental gains from trade, with proportion i 2 [0; 1] going to the supplier and with proportion 1 i going to the retailer. In the case of i = 0 the retailer makes take-it or leave-it o¤ers to the suppliers U i ; while the opposite occurs if i = 1:
Demand. In modelling consumer behavior, we follow the approach by Stahl (1982) . Consumers are uniformly distributed with density one along a line of in…nite length. Consumer's location is denoted by 2 [ 1; 1]: In addition to goods 1 and 2; the economy involves a numeraire good 0: While the numeraire is available everywhere along the line, both consumer goods have to be purchased at the retail store which is located at D : Without loss of generality we assume 7 For a non-cooperative foundation of the generalized Nash bargaining solution, see Binmore et al. (1986) . D = 0: Consumers incur transportation cost t per unit distance. A consumer, thus, bears shopping costs of t when shopping at the retailer. Consumers are identical in income I and preferences, their gross utility is given by
where 2 [0; 1) indicates the degree of substitutability between goods 1 and 2: In the case of = 0 goods are independent, while goods are substitutes for > 0. The more approaches 1 the more the products are substitutable. The utility function is separable in the numeraire x 0 . 8
Given that both goods are distributed by the retailer at prices p i ; i = 1; 2 and the price for the numeraire is normalized to one, the utility-maximizing demand of a consumer located at refers to 9 e x 0 (p 1 ; p 2 ; ) ; e x 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ); e
Consumers refrain from shopping at the retailer if their utility from local consumption and thus from purchasing only the numeraire exceeds their maximal utility from buying at the retailer, i.e.
U (I; 0; 0) = I U (e x 0 (p 1 ; p 2 ; ); e x 1 (p 1 ; p 2 ); e x 2 (p 1 ; p 2 )):
Accordingly, the set of consumers who are indi¤erent whether to buy at the retailer or not is given by
Combining (2) and (4), good i 0 s overall demand in the market is given by
with:
This assumption allows us to get computable results. Consumptions in goods 1 and 2 of a consumer located at do not depend on the distance from the retailer as long as consumptions are positive. 9 To simplify notations, some arguments are omitted in the demand functions.
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Demand functions are continuous in all variables. Di¤erentiating (5) with respect to p j , we obtain
Obviously, @e x i (p i ; p j )=@p j indicates the standard substitution e¤ect. It determines how the individual consumer's demand for good i is a¤ected by the price p j . As both goods are imperfect substitutes, this e¤ect is strictly positive. However, @~ (p 1 ; p 2 )=@p j quanti…es the impact of price p j on the size of the market, i.e. on the mass of consumers buying at the retailer. The latter e¤ect is negative as consumers bundle their purchases of both goods to economize on their shopping costs. That is, a higher price for good j induces a higher price for the whole shopping basket such that less consumers are willing to buy at the retailer. Thus, complementary arises between goods 1 and 2 as a higher price for one product reduces not only the demand for this respective product but also the demand for the other product o¤ered by the retailer. Note that the complementarity e¤ect occurs although goods are substitutable from a consumption point of view. 10 Due to these two countervailing e¤ects, i.e. complementarity and substitution at the same time, overall demand for good i reacts ambiguously to an increasing price of good j:
Let us now consider the case, where the retailer only o¤ers good i. Consumer utility from consumption then refers to
yielding the utility-maximizing demands
The set of consumers who are indi¤erent between visiting the retail store or staying with local consumption of the numeraire is then given by f j U (e x 0 (p i ; 1; ); e x i (p i ; 1); 0) = Ig :
1 0 For more details, see Stahl (1987) .
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The overall market demand, then, refers to
where e x i (p i ; 1) = 1 p i ;
Pro…ts. Using the respective demand function as well as the properties of the bargaining process in the intermediate goods market, we specify the pro…t functions of the downstream retailer and the upstream suppliers as
with :
and
respectively. Summarizing, we solve the following three-stage game: In the …rst stage, the retailer negotiates with supplier U 1 about a two-part delivery contract. Negotiation with supplier U 2 takes place in the second stage. Finally, the retailer sets prices and consumers make their purchase decision. We proceed by backward induction where our solution concept corresponds to subgame perfection.
maximizing demand, i.e. e x i (p 1 ; p 2 ); as well as the overall equilibrium demand;
i.e. e X i (p 1 ; p 2 ); as x i (w 1 ; w 2 ) and X i (w 1 ; w 2 ); respectively. The same holds for (p 1 ; p 2 ) and e R (p 1 ; p 2 ) that we denote as (w 1 ; w 2 ) and R(w 1 ; w 2 ): For later reference note that @X i (w i ; c)=@w i < 0: The reduced pro…t functions of the downstream and the upstream …rms are, thus, given by
if the retailer sells both products to …nal consumers. If, however, only the upstream …rm U 1 supplies the retailer, we denote the reduced pro…t functions as
while the upstream …rm U 2 makes zero pro…t, i.e. U2 1;0 = 0: Analogously, if the retailer fails to achieve an agreement with supplier U 1 ; the respective reduced pro…t functions are given by
Stage 2 -Negotiation with the second supplier. In the second stage of the game the downstream …rm negotiates with the second supplier U 2 about a two-part tari¤ T 2 (w 2 ; F 2 ). The …rms take the contract T 1 (w 1 ; F 1 ) with the …rst supplier U 1 as given when they determine T 2 (w 2 ; F 2 ). Using the reduced pro…t functions, the equilibrium bargaining outcome of the retailer and the second supplier can be characterized by the solution of max w2;F2
The supplier's disagreement payo¤ equals zero as the suppliers do not have any alternative to get their goods distributed if they fail to achieve an agreement with the retailer. In the case of negotiation break-down with one supplier, the retailer may still sell the competitor's good. Solving (19) for the equilibrium wholesale price b w 2 and the equilibrium …xed fee b F 2 , we obtain:
Lemma 1 If the gains from trade between the retailer and the second supplier
Proof. See Appendix.
As the negotiation outcome between the retailer and the second supplier does not a¤ect the contract chosen in the …rst stage, they have no incentive to distort the wholesale price in the second stage. The equilibrium wholesale price, therefore, equals marginal cost and maximizes the joint pro…t of the retailer and the second supplier. This makes the retailer the residual claimant to the joint pro…t. As to share the joint pro…t the retailer pays a lump-sum fee b F 2 (w 1 ) to the supplier U 2 : This payment corresponds to the supplier's incremental contribution to the joint pro…t weighted according to her bargaining power.
Considering that the retailer and the …rst supplier fail to achieve an agreement in the …rst stage of the game, the retailer's outside option when negotiating with the second supplier refers to zero. In this out-of-equilibrium event, the negotiated wholesale price is still equal to the marginal cost, while the …xed fee F 2 refers to b F 2 (1) = 2 R(1; c). Then, the second supplier gets a payo¤ of 2 R(1; c), and the retailer earns (1 2 ) R(1; c):
Stage 1 -Negotiation with the …rst supplier. Anticipating the equilibrium strategies in stages two and three, the retailer and the …rst supplier negotiate about a two-part delivery tari¤ T 1 (w 1 ; F 1 ). While the disagreement pro…t of the upstream supplier refers to zero, the outside option of the retailer equals D 0;2 = (1 2 ) R(1; c): Using our previous results, the pro…ts of both the upstream supplier U 1 and the downstream retailer are given by
respectively. Thus, the equilibrium bargaining outcome of the retailer and the …rst supplier can be characterized by the solution of max w1;F1
Maximizing (22) with respect to w 1 and F 1 and rearranging terms, we obtain
The …rst term of (23) determines the impact of an increasing w 1 on the overall industry pro…t. It becomes zero if the wholesale price equals marginal cost, i.e. w 1 = c: In turn, the second term refers to the impact of an increasing w 1 on the incremental contribution of the second supplier U 2 (see Lemma 1) . Depending on the sign of the second term, the retailer and the …rst supplier tend to upward or downward distort the wholesale price w 1 .
Lemma 2 If trade takes place between the retailer and the …rst supplier U 1 ;
there exists a unique equilibrium wholesale price that is either downward or
The respective …xed fee refers to
The distortion of the wholesale price in the …rst stage enables the retailer to extract rent from the second supplier. The direction of distortion is indicated by the sign of X = X 1 ( b w 1 ; c) X 1 ( b w 1 ; 1): 12 For X > 0 the wholesale price is upward distorted, while it is downward distorted as long as X 0: The actual sign of e X 1 ( b w 1 ; c) e X 1 ( b w 1 ; 1) depends on the trade-o¤ between the substitution e¤ect, i.e. Proof. See Appendix.
As long as products are su¢ ciently strong substitutes ( k ), the substitution e¤ect dominates the complementarity e¤ect. This provides the retailer and the …rst supplier with an incentive to negotiate a per-unit price that undercuts marginal costs. 13 That is, a lower wholesale price for the …rst good increases the retailer's opportunity costs of buying from the second supplier. This strengthens the retailer's disagreement payo¤ in the negotiation with the second supplier.
If instead goods are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated < k , the complementarity e¤ect dominates the substitution e¤ect. The positive demand externalities resulting from shopping costs imply that an increasing wholesale price for good 1 does not only reduce the demand for good 1; it also lowers the demand for good 2: Correspondingly, upward distortion of the wholesale price reduces the incremental contribution of the second supplier in the case of highly di¤erentiated products and enables the retailer and the …rst supplier to extract rents from the second supplier. The direction of distortion, therefore, depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation. The more di¤erentiated the products are the more likely the wholesale price is upward distorted (Figure 1 ).
The bargaining power of the second supplier, i.e. 2 ; has no impact on whether the wholesale price is upward or downward distorted. It only a¤ects the extent of distortion (see (24) ). The distortion of the wholesale price induces ine¢ ciencies which have to be compensated by the bene…t of shifting rent from the second supplier. That is, the retailer distorts the wholesale price with the …rst supplier to get a larger share of a smaller pie. Though the distortion of the wholesale price increases the share of the overall pro…t for the …rst supplier and the retailer, it reduces the overall pro…t at the same time. Accordingly, the retailer and the …rst supplier have hardly any incentive to distort the wholesale price if the retailer has a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the second supplier.
If the wholesale price undercuts marginal costs, i.e. k ; the retailer has to compensate the …rst supplier by paying a …xed fee. Otherwise the …rst supplier's participation constraint would be violated. If instead, the wholesale price is upward distorted, i.e. < k ; it is rather the case that the …rst supplier and the retailer share the rent shifted from the second supplier by a slotting fee paid by the …rst supplier. The …rst supplier gets a larger share of the shifted rent Accordingly, the …xed fee F 1 is increasing in the …rst supplier's bargaining power,
i.e. 1 : 14 There exists a threshold k 1 , which is implicitly given by b F 1 ( k 1 ) 0: Using (25), we get
For all 1 < k 1 , the …rst supplier pays a slotting fee to the retailer. Comparative statics further show that k 1 is increasing in 2 : Hence, the retailer is more likely to charge slotting fees from the …rst supplier the more bargaining power the second supplier has. Our results further reveal that the higher the bargaining power of the second supplier, i.e. the higher 2 ; and the lower the bargaining power of the …rst supplier, i.e. the lower 1 ; the higher the slotting fees the …rst supplier has to pay. That is, a higher bargaining power of the second supplier makes it more pro…table for the retailer to distort the wholesale price with the …rst supplier to extract rent from the second supplier. In addition, the …rst supplier is more likely to compensate the retailer for the increased wholesale 1 4 Note that the derivative d b F 1 =d 1 is strictly positive as we obtain d b
price the lower her bargaining power. 
Social Welfare
Our previous analysis has shown that slotting fees arise as a result of a rentshifting mechanism in a sequential bargaining framework. However, slotting fees do not occur if the retailer negotiates simultaneously with her suppliers implying wholesale prices for both products equal to marginal costs ("marginal-cost pricing regime"). In order to assess the welfare implications of slotting fees, we compare social welfare in the case of an upward distorted wholesale price in the …rst negotiation with the social welfare under a marginal-cost pricing regime.
Social welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and overall industry pro…t, i.e. W = CS + : Consumer surplus is given by
which simpli…es to
The industry pro…t corresponds to 27) with respect to w 1 and applying the envelope theorem, we obtain
Hence, consumer surplus is strictly decreasing in w 1 indicating that a higher degree of upward distortion negatively a¤ects consumer surplus. In turn, belowcost pricing occurring in the case of strong substitutes bene…ts consumers. The overall industry pro…t, however, is maximized for a wholesale price equal to marginal costs because of
While the overall industry pro…t is increasing in w 1 for all w 1 c; it is decreasing for all w 1 > c: Hence, an upward distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier reduces both consumer surplus as well as industry pro…t compared to the marginal-cost pricing regime. Accordingly, we can state:
Lemma 4 Slotting fees induced by a rent-shifting mechanism and an upward distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier imply a welfare loss.
Note that slotting fees simply serve as a means of transferring rents from the …rst supplier to the retailer. Thus, they do not a¤ect social welfare. The welfare loss rather refers to the upward distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier which is the precondition for the emergence of slotting fees in As the constraint F 1 0 is binding for all 1 < k 1 ; we get:
Proposition 2 If slotting fees are prohibited, the wholesale price in the …rst negotiation is less distorted, i.e. e
Note the distortion of the wholesale price is increasing in the bargaining power of the …rst supplier, i.e. d e w 1 =d 1 > 0:
Under a ban of slotting fees there is no possibility to shift rents from the …rst supplier to the retailer. Accordingly, the retailer and the …rst supplier have to share their joint pro…t by a linear wholesale price. Obviously, this reduces the retailer's incentive to distort the wholesale price in the …rst negotiation since transfers are not allowed through slotting fees. As a ban of slotting fees makes the upward distortion of the wholesale price in the …rst negotiation less attractive, it reduces the ine¢ ciencies in the …rst negotiation. Thus, social welfare is increasing if the use of slotting fees in vertical relations is forbidden. Moreover, the retailer's incentive to distort the wholesale price in the …rst negotiation is likewise reduced the more bargaining power the retailer has. In other words, the more bargaining power the retailer has the more she tends to maximize the overall industry pro…t.
Order of Negotiation
So far, we have taken the order of negotiations as exogenous. We relax this assumption in order to examine whether suppliers with relatively strong or relatively low bargaining power are more likely to be the …rst the retailer negotiates with. For this purpose we introduce a zero stage, where the retailer decides with whom of her suppliers she negotiates …rst. Without loss of generality, we assume that supplier U 1 has less bargaining power than supplier U 2 , i.e. 1 < 2 :
Our previous results indicate that the distortion of the wholesale price is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier. If the retailer negotiates …rst with the weaker supplier, i.e. U 1 ; the distortion becomes larger, but the bene…ts from rent-shifting are increasing too. However, when negotiating …rst with the stronger supplier, i.e. U 2 , there is less distortion of the wholesale price, but also the gains from rent-shifting are lower. It turns out that the retailer is strictly better o¤ when negotiating …rst with the weaker supplier in order to improve her bargaining position vis-à-vis the stronger supplier. 15 Proposition 3 The retailer prefers to negotiate …rst with the less powerful supplier. This implies that the supplier with the lower bargaining power is more likely to pay a slotting fee than the supplier with the higher bargaining power. Furthermore, the endogenous order of negotiation makes the emergence of slotting fees more likely.
As the distortion of the wholesale price negotiated with the …rst supplier is increasing in the second supplier's bargaining power (see Proposition 1), our results imply the following:
Corollary The choice of the retailer to negotiate …rst with the less powerful supplier compared to a regime, where she negotiates …rst with the more powerful supplier is welfare decreasing for all < k .
Due to the retailer's preference to negotiate …rst with the weaker supplier, the supplier with the relatively higher level of bargaining power never pays slotting fees. In turn, the supplier with the lower level of bargaining power is charged a slotting fee as long as her bargaining power is su¢ ciently low. Moreover, the higher the bargaining power of the second supplier the more likely the …rst supplier has to pay a slotting fee to the retailer, since @ k 1 =@ 2 > 0 (see Proposition 1).
Our …ndings con…rm the concerns of small manufacturers which are commonly associated with a low level of bargaining power. They complain that they have to pay slotting fees to get their products distributed by the retailer, while their larger competitors do not. We even …nd that the likelihood of slotting fees to be paid by the small suppliers is increasing in the asymmetry of suppliers. That is, the more bargaining power the second supplier has compared to the bargaining power of the …rst supplier, the more likely slotting fees are charged by the retailer.
Conclusion
We have shown that a rent-shifting mechanism in a three-party negotiation framework results in slotting fees to be paid by manufacturers if consumers bear shopping costs. We consider a simple vertical structure with one retailer Our model allows us to explain why slotting fees may vary within categories.
That is, the supplier the retailer negotiates …rst with might pay slotting fees, while the second supplier never does. We further show that the retailer has always an incentive to negotiate …rst with the weaker supplier in order to improve her bargaining position vis-à-vis the more powerful second supplier. Accordingly, our analysis reveals various hypotheses that are empirically testable. First, slotting allowances are more likely to be paid by suppliers with relatively little bargaining power vis-à-vis the retailer. Second, slotting allowances are more likely to occur, the more suppliers di¤er in their bargaining strength vis-à-vis the retailer. In other words, slotting fees are more likely to be charged by retailers the more the producers in a particular product category di¤er in their bargaining power vis-à-vis the retailer. We also …nd that powerful retailers never charge slotting fees as they already capture a large share of the industry pro…t.
In our framework, slotting fees are not necessarily used to exploit those suppliers that pay them. At the opposite, they are induced by a rent-shifting mechanism at the expenses of those suppliers that do not pay slotting fees, i.e. the more powerful suppliers in the intermediate good market. That is, slotting fees serve as a means to exploit rents from the more powerful suppliers the retailer negotiates 18 in the second place with. Even though slotting fees only transfer rents between vertically related agents, their occurrence comes along with a welfare loss. This is due to the fact that slotting fees are induced by an upward distorted wholesale price in the …rst negotiation. As wholesale prices are less distorted if slotting fees are forbidden, we can state that a ban of slotting fees would improve social welfare.
Using (31) and (32), we easily obtain
Using (34) and applying the envelope theorem, we get (w 2 c)@X 2 (w 1 ; w 2 )=@w 2 = 0:
The equality is ful…lled for b w 2 = c:
Combining (36) together with (32), we obtain b
Proof of Lemma 2: Maximizing (22) with respect to w 1 and F 1 , we obtain the following …rst order conditions
and :
Using (38) and (39) and applying the envelope theorem, the equilibrium whole-
Using (39), the …xed fee is given by
Proof of Lemma 3. In order to prove the …rst part of Lemma 3, we assume concavity of the objective function, i.e. the Nash Product formalized in (22) . 16 Reformulating (24), we obtain
with : ( b w 1 ) = 0:
Substituting w 1 = c; we get To prove the second part of Lemma 3, i.e. d j b w 1 cj =d 2 > 0; we apply the implicit function theorem to (42). Because of the concavity of (42) we have
The 1 6 The concavity has been checked by simulations.
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analysis of
Proof of Proposition 1. The retailer charges slotting allowances from upstream suppliers as long as < k and 1 < k 1 (see 26) . This can be proven by using b F 1 k 1 ( 2 ) ; 2 = 0. Applying the implicit function theorem, we get
Inspection of (25) directly implies that
Hence the sign of d k
For any < k , we know that
The second term corresponds to the joint pro…t of the …rst supplier and the retailer weighted by 1 . The derivative of this term with respect to w 1 is zero, i.e.
( b w 1 ) = 0: This enables us to write
Proof of Proposition 2. Di¤erentiating (30) with respect to w 1 , we obtain (w 1 ) = (1 1 ) (w 1 c) X 1 (w 1 ; c) (1 2 ) @R(w 1 ; c) @w 1 + 2 @R(w 1 ; 1) @w 1 (48)
with: (w 1 )j w1= e w1 = 0:
Using (w 1 )j w1= b w1 = 0 (see 47), we can write (w 1 )j w1= b w1 = @ (w 1 c) X 1 (w 1 ; c) @w 1 (49)
:
Note that the term in brackets T 1 refers to b F 1 : Since @ (w 1 c) X 1 (w 1 ; c) =@w 1 > 0 and b F 1 < 0 for any 1 < k 1 , it follows that (w 1 )j w1= b w1 < 0: Assuming concavity of the objective function, we get e w 1 < b w 1 :
Applying the implicit function theorem, we analyze the comparative statics, i.e. 
Since @R(w 1 ; c)=@w 1 < 0 and @R(w 1 ; 1)=@w 1 < 0, we get from ( e w 1 ) = 0 that @ ( ) =@ 1 > 0 implying d e w 1 =d 1 > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. Denoting the supplier the retailer negotiates …rst with by index i and the second supplier by index j; the downstream …rm's pro…t is given by We denote the wholesale prices negotiated at the …rst stage by w 1 if the retailer negotiates …rst the supplier U 1 (regime 1; 2) . Analogously, w 2 refers to the wholesale price negotiated in the …rst stage, if the retailer negotiates …rst the supplier U 2 (regime 2; 1). Since the distortion of the wholesale price in the …rst stage is increasing in the bargaining power of the second supplier, we have 0 < jw 2 cj < jw 1 cj (see Lemma 3) . Moreover, we have D 1;2 (w 1 ) > D 1;2 (w 2 ) since w 1 maximizes the joint pro…t of the …rst supplier and the retailer. To prove D 1;2 (w 1 ) > D 2;1 (w 2 ) ; we have to show that D 1;2 (w 2 ) > D 2;1 (w 2 ) : Analyzing the pro…t of the retailer by changing the order of negotiations, i.e. D (w 2 ) = 
We rewrite (54) by @A (w 1 ) =@w 1 @B (w 1 ) =@w 1 = 0; where A (w 1 ) denotes the industry surplus and B (w 1 ) the incremental contribution of the second supplier.
Using @A (w 1 ) =@w 1 < 0; @B (w 1 ) =@w 1 < 0 and A (w 1 ) =@w 1 @B (w 1 ) =@w 1 > 0 for any w 1 < w 1 ; the concavity of objective function reveals A (c) A (w 1 ) < B (c) B (w 1 ) 8 w 1 < w 1 :
Since jw 2 cj < jw 1 cj (see Lemma 3), we obtain A (c) A (w 2 ) < B (c) B (w 2 ) for w 1 = w 2 :
Rewriting this previous inequality, we get (w 2 c)X i (w 2 ; c) + R(w 2 ; 1) R(1; c) > 0:
Hence, we have D 1;2 (w 2 ) D 2;1 (w 2 ) > 0 with ( 2 1 ) > 0 (see 53): From D 1;2 (w 2 ) D 2;1 (w 2 ) > 0 and D 1;2 (w 1 ) > D 1;2 (w 2 ), we get D 1;2 (w 1 ) > D 2;1 (w 2 ) :
